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THE FALL AND RISE OF THE EXIT CONSENT 
KEEGAN S. DRAKE† 
ABSTRACT 
  Bond issuers wanting to restructure their distressed debt often 
propose an exchange offer, in which the issuer persuades its 
bondholders to swap their present holdings for new bonds capable of 
being honored. To guard against nonparticipating bondholders, 
issuers may pair their exchange offers with an exit consent. A use of a 
bond’s modification clause, an exit consent is a technique by which 
bondholders participating in the exchange also vote to impair the 
distressed bonds.  
  Use of the exit consent raises a contract question about the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing. For a quarter of a century, exit consents 
survived judicial scrutiny when they followed the Delaware case Katz 
v. Oak Industries Inc. Then, in a case emblematic of the recent 
Eurozone economic crisis, Assénagon Asset Management v. Irish 
Bank Resolution Corp., an English court found that the exit consent 
breached this doctrinal duty, seemingly upending Katz’s position as 
the seminal case on exit consents. This Note argues that such concern 
is misplaced, concluding that Assénagon augments but does not 
replace Katz. It proposes reconciling the two cases in a manner that 
upholds the common values of each case in an effort to provide stable 
legal principles amid markets in flux. 
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  If you have a 50 Dollar debt, you’re called a scrounger. . . . 
Having a 50 million Dollar debt means you’re a financial genius. 
And only a government can have a 50 billion Dollar debt. 
  – Anonymous1 
INTRODUCTION 
The year 2008 infamously saw many insolvent2 household3 and 
corporate4 borrowers. Yet even in the year of “fundamental . . . 
changes in business paradigms and the spectacular self-destruction of 
storied institutions,”5 few insolvencies threatened as many 
paradigms—or were nearly as spectacular—as that of Anglo Irish 
Bank (Anglo Irish). Barely one year after posting record profits of 
€1.2 billion,6 Anglo Irish disclosed heavy losses from investments in 
commercial real estate, subprime residential mortgages, and collapsed 
American and Icelandic banks.7 Because of Anglo Irish’s importance 
to the Irish economy,8 the bank’s financial tailspin “hurried the 
government into action,”9 first, to guarantee the bank’s most 
precarious bonds,10 and, eventually, to bail out and nationalize the 
 
 1. Jochen Felsenheimer, How To Be a Zillionaire*, CREDIT NEWSL. (Assénagon Credit 
Mgmt GmbH, Munich, Ger.), Sept. 22, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.assenagon.com/
uploads/media/Credit_Newsletter_2010_07_en_01.pdf. Dr. Jochen Felsenheimer, of Assénagon 
Asset Management S.A., added that, because of “recent developments, all of the above figures 
should be multiplied by 100 to reflect reality more accurate[ly].” Id. 
 2. Insolvency is the inability “to pay one’s debts as they fall due or in the usual course of 
business.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 867 (9th ed. 2009). Insolvency is distinct from 
bankruptcy, which is the statutory process by which a debtor, who is usually insolvent, seeks 
financial relief via a judicially supervised process for satisfying his creditors. See id. at 166–67. 
 3. Ian Bremmer & Nouriel Roubini, Expect the World Economy To Suffer Through 2009, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2009, at A15 (describing the chain of consequences flowing from U.S. 
monetary policy, eventually resulting in “insolvent households”). 
 4. Noam Cohen, A Word Insolvent Companies Avoid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2008, at B6 
(listing a variety of corporate insolvencies declared in 2008).  
 5. ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL 
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—AND 
THEMSELVES 7 (2009). 
 6. Laura Slattery, Planet Business, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007, at 4. 
 7. In Brief, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2008, at C2. 
 8. Michael Lewis describes Anglo Irish as one of three banks in Ireland taking on so much 
debt that their losses “would absorb every penny of Irish taxes for at least the next three years.” 
Michael Lewis, When Irish Eyes Are Crying, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 2011, at 174, 176. 
 9. Simon Carswell, More Questions than Answers on Government Recapitalisation 
Proposal, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, at 20. 
 10. Id. 
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bank.11 Then, with the threat of systemic risk12 seemingly contained, 
the government announced its plan for “appropriate burden-
sharing.”13 
Burden sharing essentially meant the Irish government would 
lower its cost to operate Anglo Irish by persuading the fallen bank’s 
bondholders to accept lower bond payments. Such restructurings 
occur through an exchange offer, in which a bond issuer encourages 
its bondholders to swap the bonds nearing default for new bonds that 
the issuer can honor.14 A complication arises when some bondholders 
refuse to participate or hold out for a more favorable alternative.15 
Because the distressed16 bonds continue to be valid contracts until 
surrendered,17 holdouts can sue for full payment, upending an issuer’s 
prime motivation for an exchange.18 Thus, as a preventative measure 
against holdouts, many insolvent institutional debtors do as Anglo 
Irish did and pair their exchange offers with exit consents. A use of a 
bond’s modification clause,19 an exit consent provides that the 
bondholders agreeing to an exchange for new bonds, as a term of 
their acceptance, pledge their votes to impair the contract language of 
the old bonds.20 The goal is to make the old bonds comparably 
 
 11. Arthur Beesley, Where Does the State Go from Here?, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at 18. 
 12. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198–99 (2008) (“A common 
factor in the various definitions of systemic risk is that a trigger event, such as an . . . 
institutional failure, causes a chain of bad economic consequences . . . .”). 
 13. Press Release, Minister for Finance, Minister’s Statement on Banking (Sept. 30, 2010), 
available at http://www.finance.gov.ie/news-centre/press-releases/minister’s-statement-banking-
30-september-2010. 
 14. John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of 
Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1224–
25 (1991). 
 15. Steven L. Schwarcz, Global Decentralization and the Subnational Debt Problem, 51 
DUKE L.J. 1179, 1250 (2002). 
 16. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 341 (6th 
ed. 2008) (describing “distress” generally as a situation in which a corporate debtor is “in 
financial difficulty” and therefore requires a “lessening [of] its debt obligations”). 
 17. See 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4, at 14 (Joseph M. 
Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993) (terming a trust indenture, the contractual language that backs a bond, 
a “contract of adhesion”); AARON RACHELSON, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, MERGERS, AND 
DIVESTITURES § 11:134 (2013), available at CAMD § 11:134 (Westlaw) (“The legal treatment of 
debtholders—what is referred to as the ‘bond doctrine’—focuses on the proposition that the 
rights of debtholders are limited to the terms of their contract.”). 
 18. Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off Between Individual and 
Collective Rights, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040, 1055–56 (2002). 
 19. See infra Part I.B. 
 20. Coffee & Klein, supra note 14, at 1224–25. 
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unattractive and thereby incent would-be holdouts to participate in 
the exchange, or at least to render their recalcitrance toothless.21 
Bondholders may challenge exit consents as a breach of the 
implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing.22 Under the 
leading case on exit consents, Katz v. Oak Industries Inc.,23 an issuer 
meets this duty as long as its behavior is not “wrongfully coercive.”24 
To make this determination, Katz instructs courts to consider whether 
the original contracting parties would have permitted the exit 
consent’s terms had they foreseen them at the time of contracting.25 In 
the quarter century that followed, exit consents were deemed 
permissible when they complied with the requirements of Katz. When 
one of Anglo Irish’s holdout investors sued in a case arising from the 
burden-sharing program, however, an English court refused to follow 
Katz. In Assénagon Asset Management v. Irish Bank Resolution 
Corp.,26 the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice in 
England called exit consents an abuse of “the purposes for which 
[bondholder] majorities . . . are given power to bind minorities,”27 and 
found a breach of the good faith duty laterally as among the 
bondholders.28 The Court of Appeal was scheduled to hear arguments 
appealing the lower court’s ruling, but, at the eleventh hour, Irish 
Bank Resolution Corp. (IBRC) dropped its appeal, leaving the High 
Court’s ruling to stand.29 
One scholar encapsulated the legal community’s collective 
reaction to Assénagon when she asked whether England had “killed” 
the exit consent.30 Neither hyperbolic nor hypothetical, her question 
evoked twin sources of uncertainty. In the short term, this uncertainty 
has flowed from the starkly different legal treatment exit consents 
have received on the other side of the Atlantic. Bond contracts 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
 23. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
 24. Id. at 880; see infra Part II.B.1. 
 25. Katz, 508 A.2d at 879–80; see infra Part II.B.1. 
 26. Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090 
(Eng.).  
 27. Id. [85]. 
 28. See id. (describing the abuse of power as occurring when an individual bondholder 
votes to the detriment of other bondholders in the same class). 
 29. Sandrine Bradley, Creditors Circle IBRC over €1.8bn Loss, INT’L FINANCING REV., 
(Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.ifre.com/creditors-circle-ibrc-over-€18-bn-loss/21074204.article. 
 30. Anna Gelpern, Exit Consents Killed in England?, CREDIT SLIPS (July 27, 2012, 2:22 
PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/07/exit-consents-killed-in-england.html. 
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predominantly contain English or New York choice-of-law 
provisions,31 suggesting that otherwise identical bonds could receive 
disparate treatment because of their choice-of-law clauses.32 In the 
long term, this uncertainty has flowed from what Assénagon might 
mean on this side of the Atlantic. As a Delaware case, Katz has 
merely persuasive authority under New York law.33 To the extent that 
Assénagon was more persuasive34 and English law remains ascendant 
in the realm of finance,35 the question then arises whether this 
apparent transatlantic split might actually presage a new unanimity in 
which Assénagon becomes the seminal case on exit consents. 
Ever in the background of this legal debate are global economic 
events. Indeed, there continue to be many insolvent borrowers, an 
important subset of which—sovereign borrowers—lack the ability to 
declare bankruptcy and therefore have no effective means of 
restructuring outside of exchange offers.36 While the Eurozone 
sovereign-debt crisis persists as a macroeconomic albatross,37 any 
 
 31. Many also contain German choice-of-law provisions, but German bonds require a 
unanimous vote of bondholders for modification and thus are not susceptible to exit consents. 
See INT’L MONETARY FUND, REVIEWING THE PROCESS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING WITHIN THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 25, 29 (2003), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/080103.pdf. 
 32. See Gelpern, supra note 30 (“Tons of past and imminent restructurings (think Spanish 
banks) are at stake.”). 
 33. When courts in New York have cited Katz, they have done so to support the general 
proposition that borrower-lender relationships are contractual in nature. See, e.g., United States 
v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[A] firm’s obligations to creditors are generally 
regarded solely as contractual.”); Page Mill Asset Mgmt. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., No. 
98 CIV. 6907 MBM, 2000 WL 335557, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000) (using Katz to support 
bond duties being contractual, rather than fiduciary, in nature). 
 34. 1 CARMODY-WAIT 2d: NEW YORK PRACTICE WITH FORMS § 2:336 (2007), available at 
CW2D § 2:336 (Westlaw) (citations omitted) (noting that, because the common law of New 
York derives from the common law of England, English court decisions have value in New York 
courts). 
 35. See Dominic Carman, The Long Arm of the Law—City Firms with a Global Reach, 
TIMES (London), July 25, 2006, at 4 (“Americans may now export the English language to the 
world, but English commercial law . . . remains a world beater.”); Didier Martin & Forrest G. 
Alogna, New Delaware, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB119810493339240635 (stating that “expensive and restrictive” American regulation 
makes English law preferable for corporate transactions). 
 36. Bankruptcy is not an option for sovereign borrowers, as there is no bankruptcy scheme 
for them. See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: 
EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 53 (2009) (“[P]erhaps the most fundamental 
‘imperfection’ of international capital markets [is] the lack of a supernational legal framework 
for enforcing debt contracts across borders.”).  
 37. Charles Forelle & Marcus Walker, Euro-Zone Risks Return to Fore, WALL ST. J., June 
14, 2013, at C1; Eduardo Porter, Economists Agree: Solutions Are Elusive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 
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solution demands a clear understanding of the tools for unwinding the 
most troubled sovereign bonds. Hence, delineating the current state 
of the exit consent would make a critical contribution toward greater 
world economic certainty. In that spirit—and given a lack of scholarly 
attention to date—this Note systematically examines the history, 
purpose, and use of the exit consent. It then proposes an 
interpretation of Assénagon that better accords with the doctrinal 
assumptions of the bond relationship and the economic realities of 
the international bond market.  
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I introduces the exit 
consent’s history and mechanics, and Part II presents Katz’s rationale 
for permitting the maneuver, as well as other relevant legal 
precedents. This background discussion continues in Part III, which 
details the context and facts of Assénagon. This Part closes with the 
High Court’s rationale for not permitting the exit consent. Part IV 
elucidates Assénagon’s importance with three alternative (though not 
mutually exclusive) glosses, demonstrating that the High Court’s 
analysis, however well-intentioned, unduly dismisses important 
market realities in which the exit consent is likely to be used. Part V 
proposes a means for fitting Assénagon within Katz and its progeny 
and for moving toward a true transatlantic standard for exit consents. 
First, it critiques the creation of a lateral good faith duty, finding it 
inapt for the relationships underpinning a bond like the one at issue 
in Assénagon. To close, this Part offers a refinement of Assénagon 
that harmonizes the case with Katz. Although this interpretation 
includes discarding the lateral good faith duty, more fundamentally, it 
entails focusing legal analysis upon the underlying bond transaction. 
This Note cannot envision the innumerable future scenarios in 
which an exit consent will be necessary. Rather, it aspires to elucidate 
the dynamics and doctrines implicated by the exit consent’s 
application. A thorough reexamination of the exit consent’s purposes 
and standards will not only help contain some of the most vexing legal 
obstacles in finance but also go a long way toward bringing greatly 
needed steadiness to world markets. 
 
2013, at B1; Richard Silk, Economists See Further Slowdown in China, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2013, 
2:45 AM) http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323823004578593200107930868 
(attributing sluggish economic growth in China to a paucity of export markets). 
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I.  THE HISTORY AND USE OF THE EXIT CONSENT 
Oftentimes, financial innovation gives rise to legal innovation, 
which, in turn, begets judicial scrutiny.38 In a parallel fashion, this Part 
introduces exit consents, first, by introducing a financial innovation, 
the junk bond. Second, this Part details how the riskiness of junk 
bonds gave rise to a legal innovation: the exit consent. This discussion 
continues in Part II, which catalogues judicial and legislative 
treatment of the exit consent. 
A. History and Context 
The history of the exit consent begins in the 1980s, a decade 
“mid-wived in a period of dynamic innovation in corporate 
transactions,”39 perhaps the best-known of which is the junk bond.40 
Strictly speaking, junk bonds were not innovative; their history 
extends back to the 1910s, when they financed firms in dire straits.41 
Rather, the use of junk bonds in the 1980s was innovative, as this 
dusty investment vehicle went from funding companies that had 
fallen upon hard times to funding new, unproven ventures.42 Their 
emblematic promoter was Michael Milken,43 a financier who pitched 
junk bonds using research that showed they outperformed 
investment-grade securities, even after controlling for default risk.44 
 
 38. See Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 
348 (2005) (“Modern finance and the new economic theories of the firm provided the analytical 
tools for understanding the new deals transforming corporate practice in the 1980s and how the 
legal system should respond to those challenges.”); see also Matt Levine, “Everybody’s Doing 
It” Legal Theory Does Not Protect English Bank Restructurings, DEALBREAKER (July 27, 2012, 
5:03 PM), http://dealbreaker.com/2012/07/everybodys-doing-it-legal-theory-does-not-protect-
english-bank-restructurings (“When people talk about financial innovation one of the main 
things they mean is legal innovation.”). 
 39. Romano, supra note 38, at 342. 
 40. Id. at 347. Junk bonds are bonds that major credit rating agencies categorize as being 
below investment grade (that is, with “junk” status). RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. 
MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 595–96 (11th ed. 2014). 
 41. See GLENN YAGO, JUNK BONDS: HOW HIGH YIELD SECURITIES RESTRUCTURED 
CORPORATE AMERICA 14–20 (1991) (discussing the historical background and uses of junk 
bonds). Such underperforming companies have the evocative name “fallen angels.” Id. at 18. 
 42. Id. at 21. 
 43. Id.; see Romano, supra note 38, at 347 (“Milken reinvented junk bonds.”). Books about 
Milken and his investment bank, Drexel Burnham Lambert, make for interesting reading in 
their own right. See generally, e.g., CONNIE BRUCK, PREDATORS’ BALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
DREXEL BURNHAM AND THE RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS (1989); JAMES B. STEWART, 
DEN OF THIEVES (1991). 
 44. YAGO, supra note 41, at 23. This higher return accounts for the junk bond’s more polite 
appellation: “high-yield bonds.” 
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As it turned out, the businesses issuing junk bonds were 
fundamentally riskier than those issuing investment-grade bonds, and 
therefore default rates for junk bonds were much higher than 
advertised.45 
As payment came due on the riskiest junk bonds, their distressed 
issuers faced difficult choices. A bond evinces a contractual promise 
to pay.46 To avoid breach of contract47 and the messy consequences of 
default, an insolvent bond issuer generally has three options: 
bankruptcy, bond repurchases, or exchange offers.48 
First, the bond issuer might choose bankruptcy.49 Bankruptcy’s 
main benefit is preventing a “race to the courthouse,” a competition 
among creditors in which each races to sue the debtor to receive 
priority based upon time of suit.50 The insolvent bond issuer benefits 
from bankruptcy’s automatic stay,51 which gives the issuer the time to 
dispose of its obligations and a method for doing so.52 Similarly, 
creditors have a judicially supervised process that ensures their claims 
are settled upon statutorily sanctioned priority rather than in the 
order of their lawsuits.53 On balance, however, when insolvency arises 
from a bond obligation, bond issuer and bondholder alike have 
compelling incentives to avoid bankruptcy. For the bond issuer, 
bankruptcy’s dramatic consequences may make this option an 
overreaction to defaulting bonds. For the bondholders, though they 
 
 45. PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURINGS 344–45 (5th ed. 2010). Financial literature describes these studies’ 
methodological faults in great detail. To be brief, Milken used research that measured default 
rates within one or two years after the bonds’ issue dates. Later studies—called “mortality rate 
analyses”—tested default rates ten years after the issue dates and found default rates that 
debunked the earlier studies. Id. 
 46. 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 2:20, at 175 (4th ed. 1990). A bond 
issuer makes two kinds of payments to its bondholders: (1) interest, which is paid in regular 
intervals until the maturity date, and (2) principal or face value, which is paid at maturity. 
BREALEY ET AL., supra note 40, at 46. 
 47. See, e.g., 1 ARTHUR S. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 172–74 
(6th ed. 1953) (explaining the provisions of bonds and the obligations of the bond issuer and 
bondholder). 
 48. BRATTON, supra note 16, at 411. 
 49. BREALEY, ET AL., supra note 40, at 850. 
 50. BRATTON, supra note 16, at 411. 
 51. An automatic stay halts almost all actions by creditors so that claims may be satisfied 
according to legal priority, first priority usually belonging to secured creditors. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362(a) (2012). 
 52. BRATTON, supra note 16, at 36. 
 53. Id. 
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are creditors,54 they conceive of themselves as investors who desire 
predictable streams of passive income.55 Hence, the bankruptcy 
liquidation and priority process56 does not comport with bondholders’ 
conceptions of their role.57 
Further, and especially relevant to a discussion of exit consents, 
bankruptcy does not exist for a significant class of bond issuers: 
sovereigns.58 To be sure, sovereigns have other incentives for 
satisfying their creditors, but only up to a point. By way of example, 
state governments in the United States have political incentives for 
satisfying their debts, but they are likely to prioritize those debts 
according to constituency groups.59 Given a choice between paying an 
in-state pensioner or an out-of-state bondholder, state leadership 
almost always will choose the former.60 Realpolitik, therefore, 
suggests that sovereigns and their creditors must look elsewhere for 
debt relief. 
As a second option, a distressed bond issuer—sovereign or 
corporate—might consider a bond repurchase, provided via standard 
clauses in most bonds.61 Assuming the debt is publicly traded and the 
bond issuer has access to cash, the issuer could buy back enough of its 
bonds to reduce the overall cost of its debt.62 Yet therein lies a 
paradox for the insolvent borrower. If the issuer had the cash to 
repurchase its bonds, it probably would not need to repurchase its 
bonds; it simply could continue bond payments.63 
Because bankruptcy may be impossible or too painful, and 
because a bond repurchase may be impractical, a bond issuer in need 
 
 54. Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413, 413 
(1986). 
 55. Cf. BREALEY, ET AL., supra note 40, at 46 (explaining that bondholders regularly 
receive interest payments from bonds until the bonds’ maturity). 
 56. See id. (describing the bankruptcy liquidation and priority process). 
 57. See id. at 853 (describing the expectations of a bondholder). 
 58. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 59, 67 (2000) (“Unlike [a] [r]epublic . . . , a corporate bond issuer always has the 
option of bankruptcy . . . .”).  
 59. See Emily D. Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Constitutional Law of State Debt, 7 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 149 (2012) (discussing a state’s need to “break or alter 
promises” to reduce obligations and the negative implications of breaking promises to particular 
constituencies).  
 60. Id.  
 61. BRATTON, supra note 16, at 342. 
 62. Id. The financial term for this is the “carrying cost” of liabilities. Id. at 341–42. 
 63. Id. 
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of restructuring is likely to choose the third option: an exchange 
offer.64 In a bond exchange, the bond issuer unwinds its distressed 
bonds individually by negotiating with its bondholders to accept new 
bonds with terms friendlier to the issuer.65 In turn, the bondholders 
surrender their right to enforce the contract terms of the old bond.66 
The terms of the old bond still govern as between the issuer and 
bondholders who do not participate in an exchange, however, and this 
presents a significant problem for the distressed issuer. An issuer’s 
prime motivation for an exchange is to lower the total cost of its bond 
obligations, achieved by lowering its payments across bondholders. If 
some bondholders do not acquiesce to an exchange and demand some 
payment above the exchange price, the likelihood increases that other 
bondholders will refuse the exchange offer.67 The result is the 
“holdout problem,” a variant of the classic prisoner’s dilemma68 in 
which a rational actor gains more through recalcitrance than 
acceptance.69 The distressed bond issuer seeking a successful 
exchange needs not only to create an attractive new bond but also to 
employ some means of making the old bonds unattractive. In 
practice, it does this by pairing its exchange offer with an exit consent. 
B. The Exit Consent 
In the same way that junk bonds were not innovative in 
themselves, neither was the exit consent (again, strictly speaking) 
innovative in itself. Rather, the exit consent was an innovative use of 
provisions already within the bond contract. The operative provision 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Coffee & Klein, supra note 14, at 1228–29. 
 68. The prisoner’s dilemma is a renowned concept in game theory, explaining how 
individuals act given asymmetries in information. For a general introduction to the prisoner’s 
dilemma, with explication that is particularly relevant to legal practice, see HOWELL E. 
JACKSON, LOUIS KAPLOW, STEVEN M. SHAVELL, W. KIP VISCUSI & DAVID COPE, 
ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 41–42 (2d ed. 2010). 
 69. Coffee & Klein, supra note 14, at 1228–29. Although the precise economic calculations 
are well beyond this Note’s scope, Professors Coffee and Klein go to lengths to persuasively 
illustrate that, in an exchange offer without an exit consent, all bondholders earn the most 
money by not participating in an exchange. Id.; see also Lewis S. Peterson, Note, Who’s Being 
Greedy? A Theoretical and Empirical Examination of Holdouts and Coercion in Debt Tender 
and Exchange Offers, 103 YALE L.J. 505, 515–24 (1993) (using empirical analysis to demonstrate 
that “good coercion” remediates the likelihood of holdouts). 
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is the modification clause.70 Under this provision, the bondholders 
may modify the contract terms binding the bond issuer, provided that 
the bondholders pass a resolution that meets some vote threshold, 
usually a supermajority.71 Some clauses require the vote to occur at a 
physical meeting of bondholders with some specified quorum.72 Other 
clauses permit modifications authorized in writing by a majority of 
bondholders.73 In either drafting, the modification clause likely also 
includes language specifying that approved bondholder resolutions 
bind all bondholders.74 In crafting an exchange offer, all the issuer 
need do is to make a new bond that will attract at least as many 
bondholders as would meet the modification clause’s specified vote 
threshold.75 Then, that same group of bondholders would 
simultaneously cast a vote modifying the old bonds so as to make 
them unattractive, in hopes of cajoling the participation of would-be 
 
 70. For a discussion of the evolution and other uses of modification clauses, also known as 
collective-action clauses, see generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, A People’s 
History of Collective Action Clauses, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 51 (2013). 
 71. The relevant language in Anglo Irish’s prospectus provided as follows: 
 
The Trust Deed contains provisions for convening meetings of the Noteholders to 
consider any matter affecting their interests, including the sanctioning by 
Extraordinary Resolution of a modification of the Notes . . . . The quorum at any such 
meeting for passing an Extraordinary Resolution is . . . a clear majority . . . , except 
that at any meeting the business of which includes the modification of certain 
provisions . . . (including modifying the date of maturity of the Notes or any date for 
payment of interest thereon, reducing or cancelling the amount of principal or the 
rate of interest payable in respect of the Notes or altering the currency of payment of 
the Notes . . .), . . . the quorum shall be one or more persons holding or representing 
not less than two-thirds in nominal amount of the Notes for the time being 
outstanding. 
Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC, Offering Circular, €30,000,000,000 Euro Medium Term Note 
Programme, ¶ 14(i), at 46 (May 24, 2007), available at http://www.ise.ie/debt_documents/
Anglo%20Irish%20Bank%20Corporation%20plc_8724.pdf. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Republic of Ecuador, Offering Memorandum, U.S.$650,000,000; 9.375% Bonds Due 
2015, at 95 (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.erlassjahr.de/cms/upload/
21.OfferingMemorandum.pdf (“Any Modification of the indenture or the terms and conditions 
of the bonds may be made or given pursuant to a written action of the holders of the bonds 
without the need for a meeting or by vote of the holders of the bonds taken at a meeting of 
holders . . . .”). 
 74. See, e.g., Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC, supra note 71, at 46 (“An Extraordinary 
Resolution passed at any meeting of the Noteholders shall be binding on all the Noteholders, 
whether or not they are present at the meeting . . . .”). 
 75. See, e.g., Landon Thomas, Jr., Hedge Funds Take Another Look at Greek Debt, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 22, 2012, 1:47 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/hedge-
funds-take-another-look-at-greek-debt (“Greece—in setting a participation threshold of 66 
percent—is more or less indicating that it believes that percentage of investors will 
participate.”). 
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holdouts. Alternatively, barring full participation, the vote would 
alter a covenant, the absence of which would render the holdout 
investor foolhardy and harmless.76 
II.  A LEGAL PRIMER ON EXIT CONSENTS 
Like garden-variety contract modifications, changes to bonds are 
permissible as long as they are consistent with the bonds’ contractual 
language and with mandatory rules supplied by legislatures and 
courts.77 On the one hand, statutory law addresses what changes an 
issuer may seek (and, perhaps more importantly, what changes an 
issuer cannot seek); on the other, case law addresses how an issuer 
may go about seeking those changes. This Part discusses each. 
This Part focuses on U.S. precedents for two reasons. First, 
English courts accept U.S. statutory law as persuasive authority,78 and 
English case law was silent on exit consents until Assénagon.79 Second, 
English law long permitted majority action clauses—the contractual 
means by which exit consents occur—so most modern legislative and 
judicial activity guiding the transition from unanimity to majority 
action clauses has necessarily come from U.S. legislatures and 
courts.80 
 
 76. For example, a creative issuer might increase the voting percentage necessary to 
accelerate the debt, making it nearly impossible for the remaining bondholders to declare an 
event of default—a course of action that would lower the bond’s value without touching a 
payment term. Andrew Laurance Bab, Debt Tender Offer Techniques and the Problem of 
Coercion, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 852–53 (1991). In the years since Professor Bab’s work, many 
provisions that an issuer might target have moved to the bond’s list of reserved matters, 
meaning that an issuer typically would require a supermajority vote to be adopted. COMM. ON 
INT’L ECON. POL’Y AND REFORM, REVISITING SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/10/sovereign%20bankruptcy/ciep
r_2013_revisitingsovereignbankruptcyreport.pdf. 
 77. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 507 (2014) (“[P]arties to an existing contract may, by 
mutual assent, modify it, provided the modification does not violate the law or public policy, 
and provided that there is consideration for the new agreement or that it satisfies a statute or is 
made under circumstances making consideration unnecessary.” (footnote omitted)). 
 78. See Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 
2090, [49] (Eng.) (taking note of the Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–bbbb(2012), 
specifically its “prohibition against the modification of payment terms without the unanimous 
consent of all the holders of securities issued and registered with the SEC under the US [sic] 
Securities Act of 1933”). 
 79. Id. at [1] (calling the legality of exit consents a question of first impression under 
English law). 
 80. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY 
L.J. 1317, 1324 (2002).  
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A. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 
Before 1939, some bonds allowed a simple majority of 
bondholders to modify any provision within the bond.81 Still in the 
shadow of the Wall Street crash of 1929, the then–newly created 
Securities and Exchange Commission studied majority action clauses 
and found them detrimental to the interests of all bondholders.82 Also 
present were reports of bondholder majorities acting upon biased or 
plainly false information.83 
In response, Congress passed the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 
(TIA)84 amid the legislative housekeeping that followed the Securities 
Act of 1933.85 As originally adopted, the TIA effectively forbade 
inclusion of simple-majority action clauses, the provisions that had 
allowed for prior malfeasance by bond issuers.86 Today, the TIA 
contains two prohibitions relevant to the use of exit consents. Section 
316(a) requires that, if the issuer triggers a default event, at least a 
simple majority of bondholders is required to waive the default.87 
Section 316(b) prohibits a bond issuer from denying payment to a 
bondholder without that bondholder’s consent.88 Together, these 
sections effectively prohibit an exit consent that would modify a 
bond’s acceleration89 or payment90 terms. 
Congress has said little beyond the TIA on the substance of exit 
consents, and has said essentially nothing on how distressed issuers 
 
 81. BRATTON, supra note 16, at 347. 
 82. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE 
WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION 
COMMITTEES pt. VIII, at 177–83 (1938). 
 83. BRATTON, supra note 16, at 347. 
 84. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–17bbbb (2012). 
 85. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77z 
(2012)). 
 86. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 58, at 66–67. Though the TIA is mainly applicable to 
corporate bonds, sovereign bonds de facto incorporate its strictures because their drafters often 
used TIA-compliant corporate-bond agreements as templates for sovereign bonds. Id. at 67. 
 87. Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(a). 
 88. Id. § 316(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b). But see Timothy B. DeSieno & Robert T. Carey, 
Changing Terms of Bond Indentures; Are Issuers Overreaching in Consent Solicitations?, N.Y. 
L.J., Nov. 21, 2005, at 17 (arguing that the “precise meaning” of § 316(b) is ambiguous). 
 89. Acceleration terms are within the default clause, which lists the conditions of a 
default—including a missed principal or interest payment—and a relevant grace period, if any, 
for rectifying the event of default. See, e.g., Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC, supra note 71, ¶¶ 8–9, 
at 41–44. 
 90. Payment terms include principal amounts, interest rates, currencies of payment, and 
the like. See, e.g., id. ¶ 14(i), at 46. 
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may employ them. That task of definition and interpretation has been 
left to the courts. 
B. Case Law 
English courts traditionally have been silent on exit consents.91 In 
their absence, Delaware and New York, two states well-respected for 
financial jurisprudence, have provided the leading analysis of the exit 
consent’s propriety. 
1. Delaware.  Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., the seminal case on exit 
consents, arose from transactions emblematic of the junk bond era.92 
Oak Industries Inc. (Oak) had pursued a growth-through-expansion 
strategy that became troublingly unprofitable by the mid-1980s.93 A 
potential lifeline came from Allied-Signal, Inc., a firm that 
conditioned an offer to buy $15 million worth of Oak’s stock upon 
Oak reducing its long-term debt load by 85 percent.94 Oak’s plan was 
to settle with existing bondholders using “Payment Certificates,” 
redeemable for cash above the bonds’ then–market rate.95 The 
problem was that the bonds included covenants precluding precisely 
this arrangement.96 Oak’s solution was to have participating 
bondholders vote to remove the obstructing covenants and then 
accept the payment certificates upon abandoning the old bonds.97 
Though likely to have a positive effect for Oak’s shareholders,98 this 
exchange presented bondholders with the apparent Hobson’s choice 
of settling for less than the bonds’ face value or being left with bonds 
that would be less valuable because of the lack of financial 
protections.99 Thereupon, a class of investors sued to enjoin the 
exchange, claiming that it favored shareholders at the expense of 
 
 91. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 92. In fact, Oak’s restructuring process is a part of the curriculum of leading graduate 
business programs. See generally WILLIAM A. SAHLMAN & BURTON C. HURLOCK, OAK 
INDUSTRIES, INC. (Harvard Bus. Sch. Case No. 292-086, rev. 1993). 
 93. MICHAEL C. KNAPP, CONTEMPORARY AUDITING: REAL CASES AND ISSUES 237–38 
(7th ed. 2008).  
 94. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 876–77 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
 95. Id. at 876. 
 96. Id. at 877. 
 97. Id. 
 98. The company’s stock had fallen from $30 to $2 per share. Id. at 875 n.2. 
 99. See id. at 878 (“[A] rational bondholder [was] ‘forced’ to tender and consent.”). 
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bondholders, that its structure was coercive, and that this coercion 
violated the implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing.100 
The Delaware Court of Chancery disagreed, allowing the 
exchange to proceed. Before ruling on the facts, the court resolved 
two threshold matters that would set the framework for analyzing 
future exit consents. First, the court found that the relationship 
between a bond issuer and its bondholders had a contractual, not a 
fiduciary, basis.101 Second, it failed to find the use of a “coercive” offer 
to be determinative on its own.102 Instead, the court held that the 
coercion must be characterized in some negative way, as “wrongfully 
coercive,” for example.103 In other words, legal analysis should begin 
with the adverb modifying “coercive.”104 To supply that normative 
judgment, the court reasoned that wrongful behavior might be 
inferred when the coercion violated a contractual duty.105 Wrongful 
behavior is apparent when one party breaches the express terms of a 
contract; but when, as in Katz, the breached duty was implied rather 
than expressed, the court supplied the following test: 
[I]s it clear from what was expressly agreed upon that the parties 
who negotiated the express terms of the contract would have agreed 
to proscribe the act later complained of as a breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith—had they thought to negotiate with respect 
to that matter.106 
Under that test, the facts of Katz suggested no breach. To the 
contrary, Oak offered shares redeemable above the then–market 
price,107 suggesting a deal the original parties would have approved. 
Within a year, the Delaware Court of Chancery applied Katz’s 
test to another case with remarkably similar facts. In Kass v. Eastern 
Air Lines,108 the defendant corporation had pursued a merger, also 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 879. 
 102. Id. at 879–80. 
 103. Id. at 880. The court used the homespun example of parents coercing their child to 
complete her homework by withholding her allowance until it was finished. Although such a 
situation was clearly coercive, no moral opprobrium could be attached to it. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Kass v. E. Air Lines, Inc., Nos. 8700, 8701, 8711, 1986 WL 13008 (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 
1986).  
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precluded by covenants within its outstanding bonds.109 Again, the 
issuer had approached its bondholders with an exchange offer 
including an exit consent, but this time the issuer had added a 
sweetener: for each bond tendered, the bondholder could receive 
either cash or a travel voucher.110 The court found that the sweetener 
still fell within the Katz rule because it was offered to all 
bondholders.111 In appraising the overall incentives given to 
bondholders, Kass instructs courts evaluating exit consents to 
examine bondholders’ economic motivations.112 If, for example, a 
proposed offer creates economic motivations that differ for individual 
bondholders, it may raise a fairness concern. In this way, Kass 
suggests a good faith inquiry into the motivations of the bond issuer. 
Although not legally determinative, then, each party’s economic 
motivations are instructive in answering the threshold question of 
whether to characterize an exchange as “wrongfully coercive.”113 
Katz’s progeny totals more than seventy cases,114 some related to 
exit consents,115 others simply construing the good faith duty.116 That 
latter issue of the good faith duty—and the related, broader issue of 
how far it extends—occupied the attention of other courts, as 
financial innovation spawned familiar legal questions. 
2. New York.  New York state courts have also set out important 
standards relevant to bonds and exit consents. Their rationales are 
important because New York law governs many bonds, either 
 
 109. Id. at 1077. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1082. 
 112. See id. (“Each will continue to own bonds and thus each has an economic incentive of 
the same kind to evaluate the question whether any threat to the value of his or her bonds posed 
by the amendment is more or less valuable than the consideration offered for his or her 
consent.”). 
 113. Cf. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986) (defining the wrongfully 
coercive test). 
 114. As of this writing, a Westlaw “KeyCite” search yields seventy-six Delaware cases 
referring to Katz.  
 115. E.g., Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 5 A.3d 1008 (Del. Ch. 2010); Jedwab v. MGM 
Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
 116. E.g., Airborne Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 984 A.2d 126, 145–47 (Del. Ch. 2009); In 
re Kirkwood Kin Corp. v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., No. 94C-03-189-WTQ, 1997 WL 529587, at 
*14–17 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1997). 
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through explicit choice-of-law provisions117 or as strong persuasive 
authority.118 
In New York courts, legal analysis of modern bonds typically 
begins with Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.119 
Though Sharon’s facts were somewhat complicated,120 its legal 
question was direct: How is a court to interpret boilerplate language 
in one bond when its interpretation will affect other contracts in other 
market transactions with no real connection to the case aside from 
sharing the common boilerplate language?121 The Second Circuit 
ruled that boilerplate interpretation is a matter of law, not fact, and 
that uniformity of interpretation is necessary for encouraging efficient 
capital markets.122 
The court in Sharon was clear that a bond’s explicit language 
governs the contract relationship, even if that language is 
boilerplate;123 that said, Sharon was generally silent on what implied 
covenants or parol evidence might inform the bond’s interpretation.124 
Answering this question touched upon the most sensitive legal issue 
at the heart of “the highest stakes takeover battle ever”:125 Kohlberg 
Kravis Roberts’s (KKR) leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco, Inc.126 In 
 
 117. See, e.g., United Mexican States, Pricing Supplement, U.S. $30,000,000,000 Global 
Medium-Term Notes, Series A, at 12 (Dec. 12, 2002), available at http://data.cbonds.info/
emissions/1378/Prospectus_UMS_2031_tap2.pdf. This prospectus is renowned in the sovereign-
debt field because it is the first New York bond issue with a collective-action clause and thus is 
credited with reviving the practice under New York law in the modern era. Robert B. Ahdieh, 
Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the International Order, 53 
EMORY L.J. 691, 698–702, 708–09 (2004). 
 118. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (characterizing the Second Circuit as the “Mother Court” of securities law). 
 119. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 120. In brief, UV Industries, Inc. (UV), a company that was also party to the lawsuit, had 
issued bonds with a covenant requiring the company to distribute assets to shareholders upon 
liquidation. UV sold its assets in piecemeal fashion, seemingly skirting the bond’s technical 
definition of liquidation. Sharon Steel Corp. sought to buy the last piece of UV but was 
thwarted when certain trustees (including Chase Manhattan Bank) refused to sign over control. 
Id. at 1042–46. 
 121. Id. at 1048 (citing Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 942–43 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 122. Id. at 1051. 
 123. Id. 
 124. The court did write that corporate custom “might . . . create a fact question . . . .” Id. at 
1048. 
 125. John Helyar & Bryan Burrough, Buy-Out Bluff: How Underdog KKR Won RJR 
Nabisco Without Highest Bid, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1988, at A1. 
 126. The intrigue and outsized personalities of the takeover made for a best-selling book, 
BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR 
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a leveraged buyout, the buyer satisfies the purchase price of a target 
company using junk bonds.127 Use of junk bonds harms the target 
company’s existing bondholders, however, because their bonds lose 
value when mixed with the newly acquired low-grade debt.128 
At the time, an open legal question was whether a target 
company (as a bond issuer) violated some implied duty owed to its 
existing bondholders when it undertook actions that necessarily 
degraded their bonds.129 While the question of what duties were owed 
was hotly contested in the court of public opinion,130 the sheer size of 
the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout spurred bondholders to bring the 
question before a court of law.131 In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. 
RJR Nabisco, Inc.,132 two institutional bondholders sued RJR Nabisco 
and its corporate leadership for breach of the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing.133 Finding that the contract did not expressly prohibit a 
leveraged buyout,134 the court assessed the existence of an implied 
duty in relation to those express terms.135 In other words, an implied 
duty is not some unlisted covenant but rather an understanding that 
informs whether each party receives the “fruits of the agreement” 
provided for in the bond’s express terms.136 Here, the express terms 
not only made clear that a leveraged buyout was permissible,137 but 
also that the plaintiff investors had seen and participated in similar 
 
NABISCO (1989), and a made-for-television movie, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE (Home Box 
Office 1993). 
 127. BREALEY, ET AL., supra note 40, at 836. 
 128. Id. at 838–39. 
 129. See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a 
Time of Restructuring, 38 DUKE L.J. 92 (1989) (offering various theories of the legal 
relationships between bond issuers and bondholders). 
 130. See, e.g., Allan Sloan, The Rape of the Bondholder, FORBES, Jan. 23, 1989, at 67 
(arguing that the nature of the bond relationship had changed so as to make bonds more like 
stocks); Benjamin J. Stein, A New Low? The RJR LBO Makes a Travesty of Fiduciary 
Responsibility, BARRON’S, Nov. 14, 1988, at 16, 17 (“There are questions of a truly mammoth 
breach of duty to bondholders . . . and not just to bondholders of RJR Nabisco.”). 
 131. See Bratton, supra note 129, at 95 (“Many examples of restructuring-related injury 
preceded RJR Nabisco, but it took the RJR Nabisco shock to goad players in the bond markets 
into open combat.”). 
 132. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 133. Id. at 1507 n.6. Other counts included allegations of fraud, violations of securities laws, 
tortious interference with property and contract, and violation of conveyance laws. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1516. 
 135. Id. at 1517. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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transactions.138 The court would not “permit an implied covenant to 
shoehorn into an indenture additional terms [the parties] . . . wish had 
been included.”139 
Although New York law is clear on the scope of duties as 
between bond issuers and bondholders, modern case law is relatively 
silent on the scope of duties as among the bondholders. The most 
relevant case is Hackettstown National Bank v. D.G. Yeungling 
Brewing Co.,140 in which a member of D.G. Yuengling Brewing 
Company’s (Yuengling) management141—who held both shares and 
bonds of the company—voted to delay bond payments, which had the 
effect of strengthening his position as a shareholder.142 The 
bondholders won,143 and Hackettstown became the strongest New 
York authority that stands for the proposition that a majority of 
bondholders owe some duty to the minority of bondholders.144 The 
complicating factor is that the Yeungling bondholders acted 
collusively,145 which suggests that Hackettstown is about insider 
control146 and raises the question of whether the TIA obviated the 
underlying controversy.147 As for the application of the good faith 
duty, Hackettstown suggests simply that the vote to modify a bond’s 
terms be conducted in good faith, rather than that there simply exists 
some independent good faith duty.148 This is relevant to current cases 
because the latter applies to the relationship between the bond issuer 
and the bondholder, whereas the former seems to be the only judicial 
basis for inferring a relationship among the bondholders. 
 
 138. Id. at 1521. 
 139. Id. at 1519. 
 140. Hackettstown Nat’l Bank v. D.G. Yuengling Brewing Co., 74 F. 110 (2d Cir. 1896). 
 141. This case also has the interesting wrinkle that Yeungling Brewing Company was a 
family-run business, so the offending party was a member of the Yeungling family. Id. at 111. 
 142. Id. at 112. 
 143. Id. at 110. 
 144. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 58, at 76. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 252 & n.53 
(1987). 
 147. See 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(a) (2008) (requiring unanimity to amend a bond’s payment 
terms). 
 148. See Roe, supra note 146, at 252 n.53 (“[In Hackettstown,] insiders attempted to destroy 
a bond issue but were defeated by a judicial holding that a majority vote to change a bond's 
terms had to be given in good faith.”). 
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III.  ASSÉNAGON: THE FALL OF EXIT CONSENTS? 
Assénagon is a remarkable case, and only partly because it marks 
the first time English law ruled on an exit consent149 and one of the 
few times that the use of an exit consent received judicial 
disapproval.150 The case is also an artifact of modern finance, a 
window into the collapse of an entire national economy and the 
curious way in which private debt can morph into sovereign debt. 
This Part begins by presenting the macroeconomic factors at play, 
including Ireland’s steps toward economic integration with Europe. 
This context has greater importance because every baby step toward 
integration presaged the case’s thorniest legal and practical 
implications. This Part then presents the facts of Assénagon, the legal 
claims arising from the Irish government’s use of the exit consent, and 
the court’s rationale for denying use of the exit consent. 
A. Background: Ireland, Anglo Irish Bank, and Assénagon Asset 
Management 
Upon independence from Britain in 1949, Ireland’s political 
leaders pursued economic growth through connectedness. Ireland 
began a “long love affair” with foreign direct investment in the 1960s, 
and “embraced free trade” by joining the European Economic 
Community (the forerunner of the European Union) in 1973.151  
Economic progress was short-lived: the country’s “knuckle-headed 
policy response” to the oil shocks of the 1970s led the Economist to 
call Ireland the “poorest of the rich” countries as late as 1988.152 
Yet fifteen years after being “deemed an economic failure,” 
Ireland had reinvented itself as the “Celtic Tiger.”153 Ireland’s 
unemployment and inflation rates were low; its growth records were 
unparalleled in Europe; and government debt was low.154 Reviewing 
its earlier, harsh assessment, The Economist attributed Ireland’s 
turnaround to monetary consolidation, the creation of a single 
 
 149. Assénagon Asset Mgmt. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [1] 
(Eng.). 
 150. Gelpern, supra note 30. 
 151. John Peet, The Luck of the Irish, ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 2004, at 1, 2; see also LAURA 
ALFARO, VINATI DEV & STEPHEN MCINTYRE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND 
IRELAND’S TIGER ECONOMY (A) (Harvard Bus. Sch. Case No. 9-706-007, rev. 2010). 
 152. Peet, supra note 151, at 1–2. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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European market, a boom in foreign direct investment, and an 
expansion of the labor force.155 Of the country’s growing sectors, few 
were more impressive than real estate. Construction comprised one-
quarter of Ireland’s gross domestic product (GDP), and one-fifth of 
the workforce built houses.156 Fueling the real estate boom was a 
burgeoning banking sector. At the dawn of 2000, lending to real 
estate–related concerns comprised 8 percent of composite lending.157 
By 2007, it had mushroomed to 28 percent.158 
In an era characterized by explosive growth, Ireland stood out, 
and among the actors responsible for that growth, Anglo Irish Bank 
stood far out. Incorporated in 1964 as City of Dublin Bank, the bank 
acquired Anglo Irish Bank in 1978 and then reconstituted itself under 
the name of its subsidiary in 1986.159 The growth of the new Anglo 
Irish Bank largely tracked that of the Celtic Tiger. The bank listed 
three lines of business: treasury services (traditionally commercial 
paper, currency exchange, and the like); wealth management; and 
business lending to target customers including “medium size 
corporat[ions]” and “high net worth individuals in Ireland, the UK 
and in the greater Boston region in the USA.”160 As of September 
2001, Anglo Irish reported its total assets at around €11 billion and 
capital resources of €950 million.161 Barely six years later, in March 
2007, its self-reported total assets were €88 billion, and capital 
resources were €7.7 billion.162 The eightfold increase in assets and 
capital within fewer than six years was astounding and, by most 
financial measures, unsustainable.163 
 
 155. Tiger, Tiger Burning Bright, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2004, at 2, 4. Ireland introduced the 
euro in 1999. Id. at 2. 
 156. Lewis, supra note 8, at 179.  
 157. Morgan Kelly, Banking on Very Shaky Foundations, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at 4. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Anglo Irish Bank Corp. PLC, Offering Circular, €1,500,000,000 Euro Medium Term 
Note Programme, at 41 (Aug. 15, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 160. Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC, supra note 71, at 51. 
 161. Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC, supra note 159, at 42.  
 162. Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC, supra note 71, at 51. 
 163. Alan S. Blinder, the economist and former Vice Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, 
presents a very readable discussion of debt-to-equity ratios, known as leverage ratios, with a 
particular eye to banking and the recession of the late 2000s. See ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE 
MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCE CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 50–53 (2013). 
Truth be told, financial ratios seldom “present very much insight” on their own, but rather are 
useful in conjunction with other criteria, such as industry standards, historical values, peer 
companies, and credit ratings. MOORAD CHOUDHRY, THE PRINCIPLES OF BANKING 155–56 
(2012).  
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To fund its growth, Anglo Irish issued bonds. Among the 
purchasers was a Munich-based hedge fund, Assénagon Asset 
Management (Assénagon). Founded in 2007, Assénagon managed 
€10 billion, which it claimed to deploy through the use of “experience, 
independence, profound risk sensitivity and innovative strength.”164 In 
September 2009, a German-language fund newsletter compared the 
credit markets to purchasing lemons, and warned that only ambitious 
optimism justified some of the prices.165 The newsletter’s publication 
date was within the timeframe that Assénagon made some of its most 
significant purchases of Anglo Irish bonds, by this time priced at 40 
percent of their face value.166  
Assénagon was not alone in identifying a possible real estate 
bubble. Scholars had warned of overextension as early as 2007.167 The 
same Economist article that assessed Ireland’s “economic miracle” 
summarized the turnaround as “[u]nrepeatable” and the result of 
“one-off” fortuities.168 The article closed by noting Ireland’s 
“dangerous obsession with property.”169 
B. The Case 
In hindsight, it is clear that Ireland exhibited the textbook signs 
of a real estate bubble.170 The year 2008 was unkind to actors across 
the financial sector,171 but it was particularly so to Anglo Irish. In 
September 2008, the bank had €101 billion in gross assets on its 
balance sheet, a figure that represented half of Ireland’s GDP.172 The 
 
 164. News Release, Morningstar, Inc., Assenagon Selects Morningstar to Supply European 
and U.S. Equity Data (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://corporate.morningstar.com/us/
documents/Quotes/AssenagonSelectsMorningstarEquityData.pdf.  
 165. Jochen Felsenheimer, Die Goldenen Zitronen, CREDIT NEWSL. (Assénagon Credit 
Mgmt GmbH, Munich, Ger.), Sept. 3, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.assenagon.com/uploads/
media/Credit_Newsletter_2009_30.pdf. 
 166. Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, 
[26] (Eng.). For a discussion of Anglo Irish’s collapse in relation to the broader European 
economic crisis of 2008, see generally Lewis, supra note 8.  
 167. Kelly, supra note 157. 
 168. Tiger, Tiger Burning Bright, supra note 155, at 4. 
 169. Id. 
 170. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: 
A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 274 (6th ed. 2011). 
 171. See Floyd Norris, A Year of Chaos in Finance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at B1 (calling 
2008 “the year the financial system stopped working”).  
 172. Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, 
[19] (Eng.). Much of a bank’s assets are the loans that it extends; hence, the number comes with 
a good amount of risk. See Emil Lee, Understanding a Bank’s Balance Sheet, MOTLEY FOOL 
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bank faced a liquidity crisis because of its heavy investment in real 
estate.173 Fearing systemic risk due to Anglo Irish’s collapse,174 the 
Irish government instituted a number of steps to stem the collapse’s 
effect on the broader economy.175 The government began by 
providing guarantees for the most troubled liabilities, including the 
bonds eventually purchased by Assénagon, and then by proceeding to 
nationalize Anglo Irish in January 2009.176 
The Irish government had spent nearly €23 billion propping up 
Anglo Irish before it announced its plan for “appropriate burden 
sharing” by the bank’s bondholders.177 The program’s aim was for the 
government to lower its future costs to operate the bank by having 
Anglo Irish’s bondholders agree to lower bond payments,178 and the 
plan was to accomplish reduction of outlays through an exchange 
offer paired with an exit consent.179 The extraordinary resolution 
presented for a vote was to create an issuer right to redeem the old 
bonds at 0.001 percent of their face value.180 The mechanism to create 
this right was that the bondholders signed over their proxy votes to 
IBRC, which IBRC would exercise on their behalf at the physical 
bondholder meeting.181 Assénagon did not accept the offer or attend 
the bondholder meeting, but more than 92 percent of bondholders 
agreed.182 Because the extraordinary resolutions bound all 
bondholders whether they voted or not, Anglo Irish exercised its 
newly created redemption right on November 30, 2010.183 For the 
firm’s €17 million in face value bonds, for which it had paid around 
€6.8 million, Assénagon received €170.184 
 
(Jan. 5, 2007), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2007/01/05/understanding-a-banks-
balance-sheet.aspx (acknowledging that “[l]oans represent the majority of a bank’s assets” and 
“come with risk”).  
 173. Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [19]. 
 174. See id. (noting the bank’s “systemic importance” to the Irish economy). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. [19]–[21]. 
 177. Id. [25], [27]. 
 178. Under the burden-sharing program, bondholders were to agree to an 80 percent 
reduction in bond payments, or roughly 20 percent of the bonds’ face value. Id. [30]. It was 
agreed that the reduction equaled what was then the bonds’ market value. Id. [36]. 
 179. See id. [29]–[38] (outlining the details of the Irish government’s exchange offer). 
 180. Id. [32].  
 181. Id. [33]. 
 182. Id. [36]. 
 183. Id. [36]–[37]. 
 184. Id. [37]. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, Assénagon sued, challenging the validity 
of the exchange itself in the Chancery Division of the High Court of 
Justice of England and Wales. Assénagon advanced three separate 
claims: First, the resolution conferred an unlawful power of 
expropriation to the Irish government.185 Second, the bank, not the 
bondholders, held the notes at the time of the vote, which technically 
violated the bond’s disenfranchisement provision.186 Third, the 
resolution was an abuse of power by the majority of bondholders 
against the minority.187 
For claim one, Assénagon’s theory was that the exchange offer 
constituted expropriation because the payout was so significantly 
reduced relative to the bonds’ face value.188 The expropriation claim 
carried two questions: a question of outcomes and a separate question 
of processes. On the outcomes question, though courts are generally 
reluctant to appraise economic values,189 the court seemed willing to 
side with Assénagon that the nominal amount of the payout was 
equivalent to expropriation.190 The dispositive question, instead, was 
one of processes. In other words, the right of redemption created by a 
vote of the bondholders was what enabled the nominal amount of the 
payout.191 For that reason, the payout, albeit jaw-droppingly low, was 
not grounds for judicial scrutiny; rather, it was the process that 
provided for the government to effect the low payout that should 
have been legally determinative.192 Hence, on this claim, the court 
found in favor of Anglo Irish.193 
The next two claims, however, proved problematic for the bank. 
For claim two, Assénagon’s argument was that the process of proxy 
voting violated the bond’s disenfranchisement provision.194 Anglo 
Irish’s notes prohibited the bank from “vot[ing] at any meeting in 
 
 185. Id. [39]. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. 
 189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981) (“If the requirement of 
consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of . . . equivalence in the values 
exchanged. . . .”). 
 190. Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [54] (noting that the plaintiff made a “powerful 
submission” when arguing that an English statute would not permit so low of a payout). 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. [52].  
 193. Id. [87].  
 194. Id. [57].  
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respect of Notes beneficially held by it or for its account.”195 Generally 
speaking, the purpose of such provisions is to constrain the possibility 
of vote manipulation and to promote fair dealing.196 The court seized 
upon the phrase “at any meeting.” Under the court’s reasoning, when 
the bondholders committed their proxy votes in favor of the 
extraordinary resolution, they were voting before the meeting.197 
Hence, the bank held the notes at the meeting, thus violating the 
literal application of the contract’s language.198 
In the court’s opinion, claim two—the disenfranchisement 
claim—was sufficient to decide the case for Assénagon.199 But, 
because of claim three’s “wide importance [to] the bond market”200 
(the alleged abuse of power by the majority of bondholders against 
the minority), the court went on to discuss this claim. As a threshold 
matter, the court emphasized that majorities are given the power to 
bind minorities only for the benefit of the entire class of investors.201 
Over time, this principle was extended from partners in an enterprise 
to shareholders,202 and later from shareholders to bondholders.203 In all 
contexts, though, the power to bind minorities comes from the 
company itself, reinforcing why that power must be directed in good 
faith for the benefit of the company’s interest holders.204 
Then, importantly, the court applied the bondholder’s majority 
power to bind minorities laterally, finding that a contract governing a 
relationship between borrower and lender also establishes duties 
among the lenders themselves.205 When the court applied these 
principles to the facts of Assénagon, it deemed impossible the 
conclusion that the exchange package was directed for the benefit of 
the entire class of bondholders.206 The “correct [legal] question,” then, 
 
 195. Id. [16]. 
 196. E.g., Michael Bradley & G. Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone: 
An Empirical Analysis 38–39 (Mar. 28, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1948534. 
 197. Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [19]. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. [69]. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. [41]. 
 202. Id. [42]. 
 203. Id. [43]. 
 204. Id. [44]. 
 205. Id. [45] (citing Redwood Masterfund Ltd. v. TD Bank Europe Ltd., [2002] EWHC (Ch) 
2703, [91]–[92], [2006] 1 B.C.L.C. 149, 175 (Eng.)). 
 206. Id. [71].  
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was whether a majority should be able to “lend its aid” to 
expropriation.207 The court found that the majority did precisely this, a 
conclusion at variance with the justifications by which majorities are 
able to bind minorities and, therefore, a breach of the good faith duty 
among creditors.208 “[O]ppression of a minority is of the essence of 
exit consents of this kind, and it is precisely that at which the 
principles restraining the abusive exercise of powers to bind 
minorities are aimed.”209 Hence, the court deemed the Irish 
government’s use of the exit consent in the burden-sharing program 
to be unlawful.210 
IV.  GLOSSES ON ASSÉNAGON 
So is Assénagon simply a new wrinkle in the law of exit consents, 
or does it signal the beginning of their end in the international bond 
markets? Although many immediate reactions to the case suggested 
that it is the latter,211 this Note argues that Assénagon is more properly 
the former. As one writer put it, when describing the duties in 
another financial relationship, judicial opinions are akin to data 
points, each one shaping the direction market participants take.212 
With Assénagon, the problem for the legal observer—whether an 
academic, a practitioner, a bond issuer, or a bond investor—is that the 
case could represent one of several data points, each suggesting 
different directions. This Part aggregates those data points by offering 
three different, but hardly mutually exclusive, interpretations of 
Assénagon. The analysis proceeds to Part V, which proposes a single 
 
 207. Id. [84]. 
 208. Id. [85]. 
 209. Id. [86]. 
 210. Id. [87]. 
 211. See, e.g., Joseph Cotterill, More on Those Endangered Exit Consents, FT ALPHAVILLE 
(July 31, 2012, 7:38 P.M.), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/07/31/1102671/more-on-those-
endangered-exit-consents (“Mr. Justice Briggs didn’t merely take a technical potshot at exit 
consents. He laid a depth charge . . . .”); Gelpern, supra note 30 (noting that “this decision takes 
away a major source of flexibility” and “is a really big deal”); Levine, supra note 38 (“U.S. 
courts have allowed [the exit consent] for 25 years, so it’s become standard. . . . Until today.”).  
 212. Emily D. Johnson, Note, The Fiduciary Duty in Mutual Fund Excessive Fee Cases: Ripe 
for Reexamination, 59 DUKE L.J. 145, 173 (2009); see also Developments in English Law: 
Chancery Division of High Court Overturns Exit Consent, SIMPSON THACHER 1 (Aug. 3, 2012), 
http://www.stblaw.com/google_file.cfm?TrackedFile=4B46116603DBECD896B179&TrackedFo
lder=585C1D235281AED9B6A07D5F9F9478AB5A90188899 (arguing that the ruling “calls into 
question the continued efficacy of established restructuring techniques that have used exit 
consents as a core mechanic and introduces significant uncertainty into the English law 
governed bond market”). 
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direction forward by arguing for a transatlantic standard for exit 
consents that combines the most sensible features of each 
interpretation. 
A. First Gloss: Assénagon Stands for Careful Contracting 
Bonds are contracts, and judicial contract analysis begins with a 
contract’s express terms.213 When one party’s conduct violates those 
express terms, a breach of contract exists, against which the 
nonbreaching party may make a claim and succeed in court.214 In 
Assénagon, the structure of the exit consent vote by proxy violated 
the contract’s express term that such votes be conducted “at [a 
physical] meeting.”215 That breach was sufficient to decide the case,216 
and, hence, for the issuer contemplating an exit consent, Assénagon 
stands for carefully aligning the exit consent’s process with the letter 
of the contract, or, if possible, drafting the contract to provide for the 
process by which the issuer envisions obtaining an exit consent. 
The simple appeal of this interpretation is that it also borders on 
being a truism: bonds are contracts, and contracts mean what they 
say. Moreover, some features of the bond market render this 
interpretation especially insightful. The first feature is the character 
of the parties. In the bond context, they are almost always 
sophisticated,217 which carries the presumption that they understand 
the processes that follow a default in payment or precede a possible 
default.218 Accordingly, bond issuers should use care in the provisions 
they select, knowing bondholders will be aware of differences in 
language. 
Complementing this first feature—namely, that sophisticated 
parties have the ability to craft bond contracts as they wish—is the 
second feature, which is that they actually do craft bond contracts 
 
 213. See, e.g., Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [56]–[68] (discussing the manner in 
which IBRC’s actions conflicted with the language of its indentures). 
 214. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (defining a contract as “a 
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance 
of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty”). 
 215. Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [62]. 
 216. See id. [69] (“My conclusions [on the breach of express terms] are sufficient to 
determine this case in favour of the claimant.”). 
 217. See id. [10] (claiming that the parties in the Anglo Irish case were, for the most part, “at 
the time of the exchange offer, sophisticated professional investors”). 
 218. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1509 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(deeming sophisticated investors well aware of contract terms, as they likely “review [the terms] 
carefully before lending hundreds of millions of dollars to any company”). 
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carefully. The literature on modification, or collective-action, clauses 
is vast, revealing a complex history and a multitude of variations 
across the provisions’ several discrete aspects. Modern practice 
exhibits this variation specifically on the meeting requirements. Some 
bonds explicitly require a meeting to modify the agreement;219 for 
others, a written resolution suffices.220 In Assénagon, the attention 
given to the phrase “at any meeting” may come across as 
formalistic,221 but other recent, high-profile bond litigation shows that 
courts on both sides of the Atlantic use this literalist approach.222 
Although the preceding analysis establishes two doctrinal 
justifications for accepting the “at any meeting” language at face 
value, market practice supplies a separate reason for a meeting 
requirement. Often, distressed bonds are for significant sums of 
money—each issue may be worth well more than half a billion 
dollars—which require a group of banks with broad customer bases to 
raise all of the funds.223 The influence of the institutional investor does 
mean that bondholders have a reasonable idea of the identity of the 
other bondholders.224 Still, though bondholder identities may be 
ascertainable, they are not static; publicly traded bonds may change 
hands several times beyond the point of the initial offering.225 A 
meeting requirement gives a forum to cut through the uncertain 
identities so that the bondholders or their representatives may 
physically identify each other. 
Of course, careful contracting only works as an explanation to 
the extent that the parties have a mutual understanding of the same 
language.226 The problem, as specifically applied to Assénagon’s facts, 
is that it is unclear whether the investors would have known the 
disenfranchisement provision was a part of the deal. Although the 
 
 219. See Anglo Irish Bank Corp., PLC, supra note 71, ¶ 14(i), at 46 (describing a meeting in 
the modification clause). 
 220. See Republic of Ecuador, supra note 73, at 95 (allowing for a written resolution). 
 221. Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [62]. 
 222. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 699 F.3d 246, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(applying a literal reading to the phrase “pari passu” within sovereign bond contracts). 
 223. BREALEY, ET AL., supra note 40, at 625–26. 
 224. See Kahan, supra note 18, at 1060 (“The market for corporate bonds is heavily 
dominated by institutional investors.”). 
 225. Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the 
Indenture Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2008). 
 226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 5(1) (1981) (“A term of a promise or 
agreement is that portion of the intention or assent manifested which relates to a particular 
matter.”). 
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contract language of a bond that actually binds the parties is the 
indenture, the language of the indenture is supposed to correspond to 
the prospectus, the carefully crafted legal document that describes the 
legal features. Here, the prospectus for the notes that were exchanged 
does not correspond with the language the court cites. In U.S. 
securities practice, the omission might warrant action by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for material deviation between 
the offering document and the actual contract.227 This fact, rather, 
stands for the broader principle that careful contract construction 
only goes as far as the expectations that the contracting parties share 
based upon the common language. 
B. Second Gloss: Assénagon Merely Creates TIA-Like Protections 
After discussing “bespoke” contract provisions—those agreed 
upon specifically by the parties—the High Court went on to discuss 
provisions read into contracts by force of statute.228 As an example, 
the High Court mentioned the operation of the TIA under U.S. law.229 
A U.S. court likely would not have reached the good faith issue when 
the modification of the redemption amount in this manner would 
seem to violate TIA Section 316(b).230 Under this gloss, the High 
Court’s use of the TIA is purposive, and Assénagon, therefore, simply 
creates something like the TIA for bonds governed by English law. 
This gloss, too, has the appeal of being intuitively accurate, but it 
overlooks the distinction between the contractual term being changed 
and the process by which it is changed. The redemption amount is not 
legally determinative under Assénagon or Katz. Rather, the TIA says 
only that one needs a unanimous vote to change a payment term, 
which Assénagon seems to imply in its discussion of minority 
oppression.231 The literal reading of the TIA is that it puts payment 
terms off-limits for modification, but a more purposive reading—
which is in line with what the Assénagon court found—is that the TIA 
says no process that results in a change to a payment term is valid 
 
 227. Query whether an investor would actually sue because the disenfranchisement 
provision makes the bond stronger from his perspective. 
 228. See Assénagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC (Ch) 
2090, [48]–[49] (Eng.).  
 229. Id. [49]. 
 230. Cf. Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 316(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(a) (2012) (forbidding 
changes to payment terms without unanimous consent of bondholders).  
 231. See Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [53]–[54] (discussing the value of preserving 
the minority of bondholders against the majority taking its remuneration). 
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unless it has unanimous consent.232 This reading of the TIA finds more 
support in the opinion’s discussion of intercreditor duties. 
C. Third Gloss: Assénagon Creates a Lateral Good Faith Duty 
In the context of an exit consent, a breach of the good faith duty 
exists when the issuer constructs an exchange offer that is wrongfully 
coercive.233 To this principle, Assénagon adds that a breach of the 
good faith duty also exists when a majority of the bondholders 
participate in the vote that creates the wrongfully coercive situation.234 
Or does it? Assénagon’s discussion of the lateral good faith duty is 
when the language is at its most forceful. Yet it also comes with the 
proviso that the preceding discussion on disenfranchisement was 
enough to decide the case.235 This suggests that what follows (that is, 
the discussion of the lateral good faith duty) is dicta—strong and 
ringing language to be sure, but of no legal consequence.  
Of course, the observer cannot look away from the import of this 
language on the lateral good faith duty for two reasons. First, the 
court couches its discussion in the alternative, offering its rationales in 
anticipation that an appeals court might overturn its application of 
the contract’s language.236 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the 
case reaches fundamental questions of contract law, questions of 
parties involved, default and mandatory rules, and implied duties.237 
Even if this is not the correct interpretation of Assénagon, because of 
the questions it raises and the interest it has received, it merits 
attention. Whether the standards this interpretation implies are the 
correct standards, however, spawns another discussion altogether. 
V.  THE RISE OF THE EXIT CONSENT: TOWARD A TRANSATLANTIC 
STANDARD 
Debt markets demand certainty. Among the most salient 
criticisms of using junk bonds to fund leveraged buyouts was that 
 
 232. See Trust Indenture Act § 316(a). 
 233. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 837, 879–80 (Del. Ch. 1986).  
 234. Assénagon, [2012] EWHC (Ch) 2090, [84]–[85] (establishing that the exit consent 
depends upon action by a majority of bondholders and that it is no defense to say it is done at 
the issuer’s invitation).  
 235. Id. [69]. 
 236. See id. (addressing the issue on the hypothesis that the disenfranchisement claim does 
not apply).  
 237. See id. (reaching the issue also because of its broad importance to the bond market). 
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such use turned the bond into a fundamentally different investment 
vehicle.238 Further, assurances of certainty are especially necessary in 
the context of sovereign debt, as the international character of the 
parties already injects an unhelpful element of instability.239 In an 
environment in which global finances are in flux, legal principles 
ought to provide assurance to world markets. 
For markets in search of certainty, Assénagon was a “depth 
charge” against the exit consent.240 Far from a “technical potshot,” the 
case goes to the foundation of the relationships inherent in contracts 
generally and transnational bonds specifically.241 It is this relational 
focus—and its position as precedent given IBRC’s dropped appeal—
that has stirred academics and practitioners to attention.242 But, both 
the court and its observers should save their concern for another case. 
Assénagon is an example of difficult facts making for bad law, 
but it need not be this way. Especially given the tumult in modern 
sovereign-debt markets, it is imperative that bond issuances on either 
side of the Atlantic have recognizable and familiar standards for 
workouts. Bankruptcy is not an option for the sovereign debtors who 
are most likely to use the exit consent.243 Even if the facts of each 
default or near-default vary, parties on both sides of the bond 
transaction should have consistent, clear expectations regarding the 
manner in which their dispute will be settled. 
A. The Rule of Katz Covers the Facts in Assénagon 
A natural rejoinder to the plea for consistency and familiarity is 
that, if those two criteria are paramount, then all New York law need 
do is adopt Assénagon’s standards as they apply to exit consents. Yet 
the problem with Assénagon is that it does not meaningfully add to 
Katz, which embodied the expectations most parties had for the 
process of exit consents. Similar expectations are apparent in a case 
 
 238. See Sloan, supra note 130 (arguing that use of bonds for leveraged buyouts effectively 
converted the bonds into stocks). 
 239. See Odette Lineau, Who Is the “Sovereign” in Sovereign Debt?: Reinterpreting a Rule of 
Law Framework from the Early Twentieth Century, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 63, 66 (2008) (providing 
that “a purely statist approach to sovereignty,” which “assumes the continuity of sovereign 
obligations across successive regimes and therefore mandates the payment of all debt,” is vital 
to “the stability and certainty required for cross-border lending”).  
 240. Cotterill, supra note 211.  
 241. Id. 
 242. E.g., Gelpern, supra note 30. 
 243. See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. 
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that the Assénagon court approvingly cited, Azevedo v. Imcopa 
Importação.244 There, a Brazilian soybean producer sought to 
restructure its debt and offered “consent payments” to bondholders 
voting in favor of the change.245 The Azevedo court found no 
impropriety,246 and, to buttress its finding, it discussed the Kass 
decision.247 The careful observer can draw a few implications from this 
fact. For one, the Assénagon court’s disapproval of Katz is at least 
somewhat mitigated when, elsewhere, the same court, albeit a 
different subdivision of that court, approves of another decision for 
which Katz was a necessary antecedent. More fundamentally, the 
inclusion of Azevedo suggests that, just as Katz and Kass have been 
read together, so too can Azevedo and Assénagon be understood as 
twin (and similarly alliterative) pillars of English jurisprudence on 
exit consents. In this way, viewed as a continuation of an earlier case, 
Assénagon does not mark the exit consent’s death knell, but rather its 
outer limit. 
Perhaps the greatest irony of Assénagon is that, although the 
court wrote that it refused to apply Katz, its reasoning effectively 
extended Katz. In Katz, the ultimate test is whether a court can deem 
an exchange to be wrongfully coercive, which a court appraises by 
ascertaining whether the contract’s original parties would have 
forbidden the exchange had they possessed the foresight to imagine 
it.248 In U.S. practice, the question is moot because the TIA prohibits 
such modifications to core payment terms without the unanimous 
consent of bondholders.249 The unanimity requirement here presumes 
that the modification is being undertaken for the benefit of the entire 
class of bondholders. 
Even assuming a contract regime in which unanimity is not 
required for lowering a payment term, it is difficult to envision a 
scenario in which lowering the payment ratio to 0.001 percent of face 
value would not be deemed wrongfully coercive. Simply put, 
Assénagon could fit easily with Kass among the progeny of Katz. As a 
corollary, Assénagon could stand as an extension of Katz, illustrating 
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the durability of the good faith rule. It need not stand alone as a 
refutation of Katz, especially given the consequences for the broader 
sovereign debt markets. 
B. The Lateral Good Faith Duty Is Inapt in Modern Debt Markets 
The creation of a lateral good faith duty to avoid wrongful 
coercion extends Katz in an unnecessary way. More generally, it 
confounds the expectations of parties to a bond agreement. Although 
bonds are contracts, the modern understanding of many of their 
default and mandatory rules comes from securities practice.250 This is 
different from a loan; indeed, borrowers often choose bond financing 
because they want to avoid a bank loan.251 The bonds in Assénagon 
would have a “presumption” of being securities, and upon further 
review, evince the characteristics that suggest a longer-term 
relationship than a loan.252 The securities precedent here is persuasive 
rather than determinative because it applies only to U.S. law; 
however, it does demonstrate the expectations that professionals in 
this field bring to different investments. Hence, the foundational 
understandings of securities are illustrative of the expectations that 
bondholders have when entering into the agreements. 
In issuer transactions, the focus of U.S. law is upon the 
distribution of the securities themselves, and thus focuses on the 
transaction.253 Claims in this sphere, therefore, follow along the 
distribution channels from purchasers up to issuers,254 and, although 
the transactional focus does not establish contractual duties, that 
focus is at least persuasive evidence of the way in which securities 
purchasers view the relationship. 
Assénagon turns that relationship on its side and would have 
securities purchasers looking to other purchasers for claims. In some 
instances—when a conflict of interest arises or the underlying 
investment vehicle is different—there is justification for the lateral 
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approach, but Assénagon’s facts do not align with these exceptions. 
Under New York law, Hackettstown comes closest to finding a 
relationship among creditors that would imply a good faith duty.255 
Yet that case’s utility is limited as to Assénagon specifically because 
Hackettstown does not establish a lateral good faith duty, but rather 
deals with the conflict of interest that exists when a creditor is also a 
principal shareholder.256 As scholars Lee Buchheit and Mitu Gulati 
point out, TIA § 316(a) obviates this concern when it prohibits an 
obligor or someone controlled by the obligor from changing the terms 
of the bond.257 So too did Anglo Irish’s debentures do away with this 
concern when they disenfranchised the issuer from voting on bonds 
held for its own account.258 With Hackettstown as precedent, the 
lateral good faith duty is a solution to a problem that no longer exists. 
Of modern precedents that Assénagon cites, Redwood Masterfund, 
Ltd. v. TD Bank Europe Ltd.259 is most on point—but it too has 
limited utility. In Redwood, a project-finance case, the underlying 
transaction differed in fundamental ways from that of the transaction 
in Assénagon.260 So, though illustrative and perhaps persuasive, a 
project-finance precedent should not be controlling in an 
international debt-finance case.261 
The modern bond market gives little foundation for creating a 
lateral good faith duty. One reason supporting a modification clause’s 
meeting requirement is that there is an active secondary market for 
publicly traded bonds, so the individual bondholders are constantly in 
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flux.262 It is difficult to impose duties between the bondholders when 
that class is changing. Similarly, even the identities of the parties may 
change.263 Assénagon, for example, is now known as XAIA 
Investment.264 The only anchor in these contractual relationships is 
the identity of the issuer. This is who bondholders receive 
information from, and this is who constructs the exchange offer to 
begin with.265 This relationship between bond issuer and bondholder 
girds the bond from the beginning. Hence, it is this relationship—and 
this relationship alone—that should supply duties inherent in the 
bond. 
However incorrectly applied the lateral standard may be, it is at 
least well-intentioned. The proper construction of the exit consent 
standard would keep those intentions but apply them along the 
understood lines of contract duties. Going forward, bond issuers 
considering an exchange can probably avoid legal scrutiny when their 
actions are consistent with the contract’s language. They can probably 
further insulate themselves when their offers are beyond reproach 
under the standards of Katz. Beyond that, any conceptions of duties 
owed by the bondholders may be instructive, but they should not be 
legally determinative. 
CONCLUSION 
Amid the economic tumult of the late aughts, scholars Carmen 
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff proposed the this-time-is-different 
theory of financial markets.266 The theory’s name was tongue-in-
cheek, as its gist was that financial turmoil occurs when market actors 
hubristically assume that “financial crises are things that happen to 
other people in other countries at other times . . . . We [the modern 
market actors] are doing things better, . . . we have learned from our 
past mistakes.”267 This Note argues that the same words of caution 
apply to the legal innovations tailored to that tumult. True innovation 
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is rare and traditional doctrines are as apt for modern economic 
shocks as they were for their antecedents. As it relates to the exit 
consent, the rule of Katz resolves the good faith duty in a manner that 
is practical, familiar, and satisfying. Further, creating a transatlantic 
standard on exit consents by repudiating Katz will not resolve Anglo 
Irish’s legal problems, which are ongoing268 and continue to stir 
controversy.269 
Though Ireland’s economic recovery may be in sight,270 the 
resolution of future, unforeseen economic crises will rest upon 
interpretation of this remarkable case, Assénagon. Against a 
background of market paradigms influx, courts should adapt rather 
than upend the implicated legal paradigms. Buttressing fundamental 
legal principles would do much in the way of bolstering a stronger, 
steadier macroeconomy. 
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